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ABSTRACT 
 
There seems to be divergent views on the relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance. These views seem to be inconsistent and inconclusive according to 
some researchers. Why are the views not convincing? What are the possible causes of the 
inconsistency? Reviewing relevant literature through a systematic approach, it was gathered that 
various studies approached the subject through different individual attributes of corporate 
governance with different methodologies in different situations. The works show impact-degree-
relationship or directional-relationship or no relationship. It was also found that researchers hardly 
considered environmental factors in the governance-performance relationship discourse. The study 
therefore proposes the application of systems thinking perspectives for future studies on the subject. 
This study corroborates the claim that there exist a relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance. It identifies the lack of standard elements for measuring corporate 
governance as the possible cause of the inconsistency. Contributing, the study attempted to classify 
the conclusions of identified works into three assertions to buttress the argument in favour of 
governance and performance relationship. The study suggests that policy makers and practitioners 
should take keen interest in not only board attributes but other factors within the organizational 
environment to identify, analyse, appreciate and address all possible challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance (CG) and organizational 
performance (OP) relationship discourse has not been 
considered a trending issue among corporate 
governance researchers, students and practitioners in 
recent times. It has not been given the needed 
attention as a factor, critical to organizations. As a 
result, few researchers have attempted to study this  
 
relationship because of the value placed on 
individual performance and organizational outcomes 
[1]. For this reason, some scholars have focused on 
the structures and attributes of corporate governance 
to project their impact on performance [2], [3] by 
indicating which attributes have direct or indirect 
relationship with performance [4]. The results of 
such studies have been tagged as mixed and 
inconclusive [5]–[7]. Now the question is how 
doubtful is this relationship? Are there justifications 
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for the governance-performance relationship? This 
study unlike earlier ones does not seek to measure 
the relationship between CG and OP but to 
investigate works, which have focused on the 
relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance. It examines what 
previous research evidences have told us about this 
relationship and explores the extent to which the 
evidences are relevant to the relationship debate. 
Consequently, the study offers three assertions to 
support the existence of a governance-performance 
relationship. Organizational performance still 
appears to be prone to failure [8] because it also 
appears that corporate executives [9] have neglected 
the objectives of corporate governance [10]. Coupled 
with the initial reason, some scholars have confirmed 
weak corporate governance as one of the contributing 
factors to poor organizational performance [2], [3].  
However, to be able to rescue the situation, it is 
advised that Boards of Directors ensure that 
appropriate rules or regulations, policies, and 
structures for monitoring and evaluation are executed 
holistically to promote good and effective 
administration of management [11]. In short, Boards 
of Directors in organizations are expected to 
strengthen corporate governance. Again, it is 
observed that researchers often relate individual 
components of corporate governance to performance 
through internal perspectives and that influences their 
conclusions. Internal Corporate governance 
embodies giving preference to owner‟s concerns and 
ensuring that the board checks on top management [7] 
serving as a link between management and the 
owners. But this study argues for the consideration of 
external perspective too [11]. The external 
perspective „examines and controls executive actions‟ 
by means of external policies together with other 
environmental considerations. This means that 
external and systemic perspective approaches should 
be used to study the relationship between corporate 
governance and organizational performance by 
taking the former as a whole body and relating it to 
the latter with external (environmental) factors within 
and without the organizational system that have 
interaction with it. In effect, the study argues that the 
relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance could be better explained 
if it was approached through external and systemic 
perspectives. Consequently, this study attempts to 
contribute to the discourse by presenting a list of 
conclusions of studies on the subject, discussing 
them to identify their significance and limitations and 
arguing in favour of a relationship. 
 
Organizational Performance 
The level of an „achievement to which an employee 
fulfils the organizational goals and objectives at the 
workplace is called performance‟ [7]. Performance is 
often perceived differently by various researchers, 
but most of the scholars relate performance with 
„measurement of transactional efficiency‟ and 
effectiveness towards organizational goals or 
objectives [7], [8]. To this end, Ricardo in [8] 
outlines that performance can improve based on 
effective management of organizational resources. 
He further explained that in order to achieve goals 
and objectives of an organization, strategies must be 
designed based on organizational performance (OP). 
According to [12], OP means the „transformation of 
inputs into outputs for achieving certain outcomes‟. 
This implies that OP involves analysing a company‟s 
output of work against its objectives and goals. In 
other words, OP comprises real results or outputs 
compared with intended outputs. 
Developing a high performance organization is an 
appropriate and achievable goal in today‟s business 
environment. „High performance‟ organizations are 
regarded as „best of class‟ [9]. Such organizations do 
a lot more rather than ordinary survival. They 
prosper due to their inherent ability to perform and 
adapt to greater extent and tougher environments 
than their competitors. As a result, high performance 
organizations deliver greater satisfaction and 
maximum long term value [7] to their stakeholders 
through the management of available resources. 
Sustained high performance comes from an 
organization‟s capacity to deliver results [13] in the 
short term while rapidly adapting to a longer term‟s 
external and internal changes. In relatively stable 
conditions, creating a high performance organization 
is a significant challenge. In this regard, conducive 
organizational environment becomes one factor that 
can boost OP [14]. To show the relevance of 
performance to the organization, [15] posited that 
performance and effective organization have a high 
degree of collaboration.   
 
Measuring Organizational Performance  
According  to [16]–[18], there is no general 
agreement  in  literature  on the  standards  to be used 
in measuring  OP . However, there are four main 
dominant approaches which are often used for 
measuring OP. First is the Goal Approach. This 
approach explains that organizations are created for 
certain specific purposes and the purposes are 
determined by stakeholders (consistent with 
Stakeholder Theory). The next is the System 
Resource Approach (consistent with Resource 
Dependency Theory), which points out the relation 
between the organization and the environment. [19] 
Volume 8 | Issue 1 | January-December -2019 [(8)1: 509-518] | http://onlinejournal.org.uk/index.php/ajmur  
believes in this and asserts that an organization 
becomes effective when it takes advantage of its 
environment in the attainment of high value. To this 
end, [18] affirms that organizations with more 
control over resources are likely to have the most 
influence on the performance. The third is the 
Constituency Approach. According to [20], an 
organization is considered effective when its multiple 
stakeholders perceive it as effective. They seem to 
suggest that performance is a perception. Last but not 
least is the Competing Values Approach which was 
developed by [21]. This approach opines that 
organizational goals are created in different ways by 
the various expectations of multiple districts 
(consistent with Social Contract Theory). Therefore, 
organizations may have different criteria to measure 
performance. According to [21], stakeholders support 
the adaptability of their organizations. They want the 
actors to be flexible, stable and effective. Finally, OP 
can be classified into three specific areas: (a) 
financial performance, (b) product market 
performance and (c) shareholder returns. Ultimately, 
all of these three classifications can be achieved best 
where good corporate governance exists. 
 
Corporate Governance  
Corporate governance, as a concept has varied 
definitions and describes how organizations are 
managed or controlled. CG is basically concerned 
with building trust, ensuring accountability and 
transparency [11]. It is a system of ensuring an 
effective way of information disclosure [22], [23] so 
as to bridge the information gap between 
organizations and their stakeholders [8] in order to 
resolve the agency problem [11] and improve 
performance [2], [10]. CG ensures that 
responsibilities are clearly defined among all 
stakeholders in order to facilitate the implementation 
of policies [11]. [24] offer a concise definition, 
stating that CG is „concerned with a collective action 
resolution for the purposes of promoting 
improvements in performance‟. Where corporate 
governance mechanisms are non-existent, 
stakeholders may suffer difficulties of monitoring 
and administrators or managers may also misuse 
organizational property or assets to the detriment of 
shareholders [25]–[27]. When this occurs, it will 
impact negatively on the performance of firms[11]  
Tang & Chang, 2015). This means that managers in 
organizations with weak CG can easily abuse 
accounting discretion [7], [25], [28] compared to 
those in organizations with strong CG. Therefore, 
CG demands that managers become competent, 
proficient and skilful in conceptual thinking, goal 
setting [7], [11] and developing strategies to arrive at 
suitable decisions. In CG, Boards of Directors (BoDs) 
are expected to provide guidance, direction and 
create conducive environment that encourages 
management [7] and staff to work effectively for 
performance maximization [26] and wherever this 
exists, good CG exists. Good CG is based on the 
principles of integrity, openness and accountability 
[29] and promotes sound internal control systems, 
risk management, compliance with ethical and 
statutory requirements, ensure transparency [11], 
accountability and trust in the management of 
organizations [30]. Good CG involves good 
management judgment and compliance [4] to boost 
investor confidence in organizations [25], [31], [32]. 
Similarly, good governance is also the expectation 
and confidence of even the yet-to-be investors of the 
organization. Hence, the primary role of CG towards 
achieving good performance is the provision of good 
governance or good leadership. Good leadership is 
one of the vital factors for improving performance in 
organizations. Leaders, as the key decision-makers 
determine the acquisition, development, and 
distribution of organizational resources, the 
conversion of these resources into valuable products 
and services. Good leaders provide opportunities for 
the staff to perform their work effectively. They are 
also responsible for guiding, mentoring and coaching 
their subjects in the organization to achieve the target 
results. The background to the formation of 
companies or organizations indicates that public 
companies were created through „incorporation‟ as 
legal entities which were separate from their owners 
(dating back to 1844). A company became a legal 
„person‟ which could employ people, enter into 
contracts, sue and be sued [33]. The company was 
viewed as a „little republic and a miniature political 
system‟ in which all its members including 
shareholders, had rights to representation, 
information and decision-making [10], hence, the 
birth of corporate governance. CG rests on theories. 
These theories of CG started with the agency theory, 
which extended into stewardship and stakeholder 
theories [34]. Later, these evolved to resource 
dependency theory, political theory, legitimacy 
theory and social contract theory [7]. All these 
theories provide a way by which an organization is 
viewed, the function of the various elements and 
their relationship in the organization.  
 
Agency Theory  
The principal-agent theory is generally considered 
the starting point for debates on the issue of 
corporate governance. According to this theory, the 
fundamental agency problem is the separation 
between the principal (owners) and the agent 
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(management). Jensen and Meckling in [35] describe 
this relationship as a contract under which a principal 
engages an agent to perform some service on the 
principal‟s behalf, which involves delegating some 
decision-making authority to the agent. The gap that 
is generated by the separation induces fear. Fear that 
professional managers (agents) cannot be held 
accountable by the widespread shareholders and that 
the agent may extract „perquisites‟ (perks) out of an 
organization‟s resources. This problem causes the 
principals to be confronted with two main problems – 
selection of the most capable managers and how to 
prevent moral hazards in the organization. To address 
this, efforts have been made to look into composition 
of board of directors and CEO duality. The board of 
directors is expected to be made up of more non-
executive directors (NEDs) for effective control, 
reducing conflicts of interest and ensuring a board‟s 
independence in monitoring and passing fair and 
unbiased judgment on management. On the other 
hand, CEO duality is expected that different 
individuals occupy the positions of CEO and board 
chairperson as this will reduce the concentration of 
power in one individual and thus greatly reducing 
undue influence of particular management and board 
members.  
 
Stewardship Theory  
This theory argues against the agency theory that 
managerial opportunism is not relevant [26]. It 
argues that a manager‟s purpose in an organization is 
to maximize performance. The theory stipulates that 
the positions of CEO and board chair should be 
concentrated in the same individual as against the 
stance of agency theory. The reason is that it affords 
the CEO the opportunity to carry out decisions 
quickly without the hindrance of undue bureaucracy. 
Finally, it argues that „small board sizes‟ should be 
encouraged to promote effective communication and 
decision-making. Though this theory tries to replace 
the lack of trust and kill the fear that the agency 
theory generates with regard to unaccountability and 
unethical behaviours, it fails to define the „smallness‟ 
of board size.  
 
Stakeholder Theory  
The stakeholder theory stipulates that a corporate 
entity invariably seeks to provide a balance between 
the interests of its diverse stakeholders in order to 
ensure that each interest constituency receives some 
degree of satisfaction [10], [36]. The stakeholder 
theory appears better to explain the role of corporate 
governance than the agency theory by highlighting 
the various components of an organization. Thus, 
owner, BoDs, staff, governments and society are 
regarded as relevant stakeholders [37], [38] The 
stakeholder theory also emphasize the role of size of 
the boards and committees structure as important to 
performance. However, it has become more 
prominent because many researchers have 
recognized that the activities of a corporate entity 
impact on the external environment requiring 
accountability of the organization to a wider 
audience than simply its shareholders [36]. To this 
end, is should be noted that companies are no longer 
the instrument of shareholders alone but exist within 
society and, therefore, has responsibilities to that 
society [36], [39].  
 
Resource Dependency Theory  
This theory indicates that the firm‟s presence on the 
boards of other organizations is relevant to 
establishing relationships in order to have access to 
resources in the form of information which could 
then be utilized to the firm‟s advantage. In other 
words, this theory shows that the strength of a 
corporate organization lies in the amount of relevant 
information it has at its disposal. The theory points 
out that, organizations usually tend to reduce the 
uncertainty of external influences by ensuring that 
resources are available for their survival and 
development. By implication, this theory seems to 
suggest that the issue of dichotomy between 
executive and non-executive directors is actually 
irrelevant [37]. Consequently, all four theories 
mentioned above underscore Boards of Directors as 
an essential element in CG. The corporate board 
could be identified as panacea to addressing the 
corporate challenge. No wonder BoDs have become 
a central subject of study so far as corporate 
governance is concerned. Most researches in CG 
focus on the BoDs – their features and activities in 
the organization. In other words, to study corporate 
governance means to study the BoDs.  
 
Measuring Corporate Governance 
Corporate boards are responsible for major decisions 
in an organization. For example, decisions like 
changing by-laws, issuing of shares, declaring of 
dividends among others. This explains to some extent, 
the reason why discussions of corporate governance 
usually focus on boards. The board of directors is the 
„apex‟ of the controlling system in an organization. 
Therefore, to measure corporate governance has 
caused researchers to focus on measuring the 
attributes of BoDs, and their function. But is it the 
mere existence of the structures or attributes that 
count? CG should be linked more to duty rather than 
mere structures. This means that meeting the 
attribute-requirements alone is not a panacea to good 
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governance. The most important thing is 
commitment to duty. Research has not established a 
common set of elements to be used as measuring 
variables for CG. Different researchers use different 
„BoD‟ attributes as proxy to measure CG and this 
creates inconsistency [2], [7], [40]. Such attributes 
include board size, female representation on boards 
(gender), CEO duality, board independence, board 
composition and more. However, we think that CG 
should not be measured in isolation. The 
environment within which BoDs operates with 
emphasis on their function should be factored, in 
other words, approaching the study or practice of CG 
with systems thinking perspectives. 
 
Systems Thinking 
Systems thinking implies a way of thinking whereby 
a system is understood in relation to its surrounding 
world [41] or environment. A system may refer to an 
organization, object, a program or concept. Elements 
within a system share some interaction or 
interdependency. In this regard, we perceive an 
organization as a system – a body of several elements 
which interact together to perform a common 
function or relate to each other to achieve a common 
goal within an environment. By this, we adopt 
Bertalanffy‟s definition [7] that a system is „a 
complexity of interacting elements‟ within a given 
environment, where „interaction‟ means the 
relationship between elements‟. Environment means 
a collection of outside of the world of a system and 
its associated things. Therefore, when CG is 
measured considering the environment of the 
organization, results generated would be better [5]. 
Understanding the dynamics of a system can be 
viewed through both external and internal 
perspectives [41]. The external perspective approach 
considers a system as a singular whole entity and 
focuses on its overall characteristics, the nature and 
trends of its environment, the dynamics of its 
interactions with its environment and its evolution 
over time while the internal perspective approach 
involves examining a system‟s internal functioning 
and considering all of its component elements, the 
dynamics of how they interact and how they are 
integrated into a singular whole entity [41]. These 
perspectives are consistent with the holistic approach 
which requires the integration of all influencing 
factors into an overall representation of a situation 
[41]. Hence, we agree with Heracleous in [7], that to 
relate corporate governance to organizational 
performance, one needs to adequately consider 
systemic influences or other linkages, lest such an 
attempt is „bound to produce weak and inconsistent 
results‟ [2], [7]. Find below a framework suggesting 
the relationship between CG and OP. In Figure 1, the 
main variables or elements proposed to underscore 
the relationship are Corporate Governance, 
Management and staff, Organizational Performance 
and Environment. Three variables are part or 
elements of „system‟ or the organization. Though a 
system may have other important elements within it, 
which help it to function, such other elements have 
been intentionally muted so as to project the named 
ones. Another key feature of the framework is that 
though corporate governance could be considered as 
systems, it is here considered as element of the 
organization. Furthermore, the framework exhibits 
different kinds of relationship such as directional, 
corresponding and impact (significance). The 
positive sign connotes good governance or high 
performance but the negative sign connotes poor 
governance or low performance. The boundary sets 
the limits for the system. It is identified that the 
organization (system) and the environment have 
correlation effect on each other but this will be 
considered in a future research. 
 
(CG: Corporate Governance, M: Management, OP: 
Organizational Performance) Fig.1: Systems 
Elements Relationship Framework (Source: Authors) 
 
Apart from illustrating the interaction between the 
elements, the model can be expressed mathematically 
as             to explain the impact of the 
independent variable (corporate governance) on 
management and performance. In the equation,   is 
constant and represents environmental factors 
(     ),   is independent variable and represents 
corporate governance        ,   is dependent 
variable and represents management     and   is 
results or outcomes and represents organizational 
performance       . 
                        
Note that corporate governance quality may be 
positive or negative. And in each case, the quality of 
Management (strategy and implementation) will be 
affected. This means that improvement or decline in 
the quality of corporate governance ensures an 
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improvement or decline in the quality of strategy and 
implementation which together with its 
environmental factors result in rise of fall of 
organizational performance. 
 
METHODS 
It is agreed universally that there are primary and 
secondary data. This study adopted the latter, which 
covers information gathered from textbooks, theses 
and journal articles, statutory and non-statutory 
documents through a systematic review approach. As 
a result, a search was conducted across relevant 
library and external sources including Google, 
ABI/INFORM® (ProQuest, Ann Arbor, MI, USA), 
SciVerse® ScienceDirect® (Elsevier, Amsterdam, 
the Netherlands) and the Social Science Research 
Network, from 2010 to 2019. The search retrieved 
over a thousand results using some phrases as 
„relationship between corporate governance and 
organizational performance‟, „corporate governance 
and firm performance‟, „corporate governance and 
performance‟, „good governance and performance‟, 
„organizational performance‟, „corporate governance‟ 
and others. The related and relevant literature was 
downloaded after scheming through the titles. 
Afterwards, thorough selection process was carried 
out with the inclusion and exclusion criteria that were 
set for literature gathering. The inclusion criteria 
were that literature must be relevant to subject, 
journal articles must fall within the year range of 
2000 to 2019, however, older but very relevant 
literature was accepted. Any literature that fell 
outside the criteria was ignored. This scaled down 
the number to a bearable size of 59. The finally 
selected literature was read and the needed 
information was churned out through a realist 
approach to an evidence based synthesis of literature. 
The findings were tested, honed, refined and used for 
the composition of the study. The study adopted 
subjective approach discussion. 
 
DISCUSSION 
Though some studies argue for nonexistence of a 
correlation between CG and OP, such studies are few. 
And even in that case, they assert that some (not all) 
CG attributes have no significant impact on OP. For 
example, it is reported that „there's no significant 
impact for ownership of the largest shareholder and 
independency of Board of Directors on firm's market 
performance‟ [42]. Similarly, [42] also stated in their 
work that „there is no significant impact for corporate 
governance adoption on firm's operational and 
financial performance‟. However, there is also the 
argument for no right or wrong model in corporate 
governance and that the practice of good CG does 
not guarantee high performance as stated by 
Chambers & Cornforth in [7] but Gillies and Morra 
hold a contrary view and posit that common sense 
tells that there‟s a correlation between CG and OP. 
To Gillies and Morra, the correlation or relationship 
between CG and OP should not be a subject of 
debate. The answer is obvious. But the question is 
how convincing is the argument of the relationship 
established? To this end, our study presents three 
projections with sample of findings from empirical 
works to corroborate the argument for existence of a 
correlation between CG and OP.  
 
Assertion 1: There is a relationship between 
corporate governance and performance 
Research outcomes on the subject argue with 
divergent views [43] and Chambers & Cornforth in 
[7], be it empirical or theoretical. Despite the stance 
„against‟ the debate, there is enough evidence to 
support the argument for existence of a correlation 
between CG and OP [44] including economic 
performance of nations [45] and this is why 
companies are trying hard to inculcate the practice of 
good CG [46] in spite of the dilemma to maximize 
output. The works of [2], [4], [27], [40], [47], [48] 
and [49] confirm the existence of a relationship 
between CG and OP. Their works corroborate the 
earlier position of Gillies and Morra that „common 
sense tells us that there is a relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance‟.  In 
their works, they used expressions such as „positive 
or negative impact‟ to show the degree of the 
correlation and „direct or indirect impact‟ to show the 
directional nature of the relationship [45]. For 
example, it has been identified in leadership studies 
that effective  human  resources management  
mediates  the  relationship  between leadership  and  
performance  through  increased commitment,  
higher  motivation  and  intellectual motivation [50]. 
This means that though there is a relationship 
between leadership (CG) and performance, this 
relationship is indirect. To buttress the CG and OP 
relationship, [51]  emphasized  that  transformational 
(good) leadership (CG)  relates  positively  and  
significantly  to organizational performance basing 
his assertion on a research conducted on 151 
companies from  IT  industries. Similarly, numerous 
studies have stated positive relationships between 
good  leadership  and  outcomes at  the  individual  
level  and  firm  levels  [52] and [53]. A study 
conducted on 170 companies from Singapore on the 
connection between leadership style and 
organizational performance identified a positive 
relationship between leadership and organizational 
performance. It argued that many empirical studies 
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have reported  that leadership (CG)  has an impact or 
(and) directional relationship  with  performance or  
firm outcomes  [54]–[56]. 
 
Assertion 2: Good corporate governance 
promotes high performance and vice versa 
 
Besides the category of studies which holds the first 
assertion is another category of works which purport 
that good corporate governance promotes high 
performance. The reverse is also true. Assertion 2 
indicates that the quality of a CG has a corresponding 
quality effect on OP. This assertion is evident in the 
expressions found in some empirical works: 
„effective corporate governance system results in 
high performance‟ Changezi and Saeed, in [7]; 
„better governance contributes to higher provisions 
and reserves of financial institutions‟ [47]; „best 
practices of corporate governance boost the economy 
and thus improve the performance of the national 
economy‟ [45]; „better governance increases the 
sensitivity of firm profitability to industry 
profitability‟ [57]; and „weak corporate governance 
was a contributing factor to poor performance‟ 
Olannye and David in [7]. Here, special notice is 
placed on the careful use of adjectives (effective, 
better, best practices and weak) to modify CG while 
their corresponding adjectives (high, higher and poor) 
were attributed to OP. However, the use of some 
verb phrases like results in, contributes to, boost, 
improve and increases helped to establish the 
assertion. The proposed model „Systems Elements 
Relationship Framework (SERF)‟showed in Figure 1 
gives a diagrammatic explanation of the CG and OP 
interplay. The model projects two positions. First is 
the position that good CG promotes high OP and the 
reverse. This position that good governance promotes 
high performance and high performance promotes 
good CG may be true in the sense that shareholders, 
managers and board members are motivated by high 
performance. This may encourage the setting of 
higher targets by boards, provision of more resources 
to management and yielding of more dividends to 
shareholders. It has been observed that where there is 
high performance, actors become high spirited to 
work hard and achieve more. In this direction, board 
members would be confident to apply all the 
necessary principles and strategies while 
management and staff would be highly motivated to 
implement plans and strategies. In effect board 
members may gain the confidence of shareholders. 
The second position shows that good CG may 
correspond to high OP while poor CG may 
correspond to poor OP (where constant is always 
positive). However, the latter position may change 
(where constant becomes negative). This means that 
environmental circumstance which is always 
constant, depending on its positive or negative form 
predicts the corresponding impact of CG. This 
suggests that improved governance can even be 
affected by a negative environmental circumstance to 
alter performance. Notwithstanding, the position of 
both the model and the assertions have not been 
tested and therefore, it is recommended for further 
studies and investigation. 
 
Assertion 3: Some governance attributes have 
positive or adverse impact on performance 
 
Most corporate governance literature place emphasis 
on the study of board attributes. Such attributes 
include CEO duality, board size, information 
disclosure, ownership, board composition, audit 
committee size, female gender representation and 
more. In several cases, such attributes are used as 
proxy for measuring corporate performance. Though 
these attributes are used in different ways with 
different methodologies, they exhibit different impact 
relationships on performance. For example, [58] 
concluded in their work that „CEO duality and board 
dependence negatively affect performance‟. 
Similarly, [7] found that „CEO duality has 
statistically significant negative impacts on firm 
performance‟. We also found in another work that 
„corporate governance through ethical behaviour has 
positive effect on employees‟ productivity‟ [8].  
In other sampled empirical works it was identified 
that „corporate disclosure practices have positive 
effects on company performance and negative effects 
on company leverage‟ [48]; „Significant impact was 
found for the ownership and the size of the Board of 
Directors on firm's performance‟ [42] „Board size, 
Board composition and audit committee size have 
significant effect on return on capital employed‟ [11]. 
„Once board conflict is resolved, organization 
performance changed by 7%‟[26]. These examples 
shown above give credence to the fact that board 
attributes are often used as proxy to measure 
corporate governance and also to demonstrate the 
sort of effect  the attributes have on organizational 
performance (positive or negative, significant or 
insignificant). Ultimately, this assertion also supports 
the argument that there is a relationship between CG 
and OP by demonstrating how and the nature of 
relationship. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
In recent years, the public has demonstrated great 
concern by calling for sanity in organizations as a 
result of corruption and underperformance. This has 
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necessitated the need for reforms in the entire field of 
Corporate Governance system [43] in the global 
arena. However, it appears that corporate executives 
[9] have neglected the objective of CG [10] despite 
the looming tendency that organizational 
performance still appears to be prone to failure [8]. 
According to literature, CG is examined from two 
points of view; the narrow (internal) and the broad 
(external) perspectives [11]. The narrow perspective 
looks at the structure within which organizations are 
directed while the broad perspective focuses on both  
market and society [11], [29]. Internal Corporate 
governance  gives preference to owner‟s concerns 
and ensures that the board checks on top 
management [7] serves as a link between 
management and owners but the external corporate 
governance „examines and controls executive actions‟ 
by means of external policies about other 
stakeholders [11] - customers and society in general. 
Next, the study identified three weaknesses in the 
approaches of researchers to the subject under 
consideration. First, they use board attributes as 
proxy for measuring CG since there are no standard 
elements for measuring CG. Second, researchers 
relate individual elements of board attributes to 
performance [59] as if it is the mere presence or 
existence of the CG structures that influence 
performance. Instead, researchers must place more 
emphasis on duties of the board as a way to measure 
performance. We think that it is possible to have all 
the CG structure in place without seeing good 
performance in an organization. Finally, it is 
identified that almost all considered works on the 
subject in question have been pursued without 
considering the external environment of the 
organization. Consequently, the study concludes that 
there is a relationship between corporate governance 
and performance [2], [4], [27], [47], [49]. CG and OP 
have directional and impact relationships. Also, the 
study concludes that good corporate governance 
promotes high performance while poor governance 
leads to poor performance. In other words, CG 
quality and OP quality have direct corresponding 
relationship [57]. The last but not least of the 
conclusions is that some governance attributes have 
positive or adverse impact on performance [7], [11], 
[26], [42], [58]. In view of this study, we confirm the 
existence of a relationship between CG and OP and 
support the argument that the relationship discourse 
has not been conclusive and convincing [5] due the 
weaknesses identified in the early studies [2], [7]. 
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